If the government knows my location and the fact that I'm using Tor, then what's the whole point of onion routing?

According to this infographic, Tor usage along side HTTPS merely hides the domain name and content of the website, but doesn't do anything to hide my location or the fact that I'm using Tor. A person living under a totalitarian regime will get completely fucked since the government can just knock on their door and accuse them of bullshit for trying to hide their internet traffic.

Unless I'm missing something, what's the whole point of Tor and onion routing in this case? Aren't I better off not trying to hide my traffic, since any attempt at doing so would raise some government eyebrows?

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πŸ“°︎ r/onions
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πŸ‘€︎ u/TorAnonymousOnion
πŸ“…︎ Oct 10 2020
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Is Slytherin Mail a reference to the onion routing?
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πŸ‘€︎ u/UQuark
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why doesn't the simple-gui version come with integrated onion routing?

would at least add another layer of privacy when using remote nodes, no?

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πŸ“°︎ r/Monero
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πŸ‘€︎ u/btsfav
πŸ“…︎ Jun 07 2020
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New onion routing protocol based on Blockchain tech

Lokinet. Seems pretty cool and utilises some crypto tech to economically protect the network. Here's an animationexplaining things much better than i could. What do you guys think?

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πŸ“°︎ r/CryptoTechnology
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onΒ·ionΒ·yΒ·mous /Ι™nyΙ™nΙ™mΙ™s/ (adjective): having one’s connection origin obfuscated by onion routing

Tor isn’t anonymous, and pseudonymous applies more to the activities facilitated by the connection β€” how about a new word to better describe the obfuscating effects of the connection itself?

Proposed usage

> Just being onionymous should be good enough for my needs.

> You can’t be truly anonymous in Tor, but you can be onionymous and pseudonymous.

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πŸ“°︎ r/TOR
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πŸ‘€︎ u/carrotcypher
πŸ“…︎ Aug 23 2020
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Pretty video explaining why Lightning's onion routing is not censorship resistant. Compared to Tor, it's very easy to de-anonymize transactions, due to public balances in state channels [5 min] youtu.be/rgts1qb0hLY?h
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πŸ‘€︎ u/hugelung
πŸ“…︎ Oct 18 2019
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Session message routing solution | Onion requests youtube.com/watch?v=Q75jV…
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πŸ“°︎ r/LokiProject
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πŸ‘€︎ u/24bitFLAC
πŸ“…︎ Jan 30 2020
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I made an extensive explainer video about Onion Routing on the Lightning Network with a camera paid by this amazing community! Enjoy! youtube.com/watch?v=toarj…
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πŸ‘€︎ u/renepickhardt
πŸ“…︎ Jan 22 2019
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Lightning Network Onion Routing, Lack of Anonymity, and Other Woes youtu.be/rgts1qb0hLY
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πŸ‘€︎ u/don-wonton
πŸ“…︎ May 04 2018
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Does Lightning Network Onion Routing provide TOR-like privacy?

No.

In fact, LN doesn't claim to be anything like TOR. The closest association I've found is LN claims to use a "mix-net like packet". Still, some LN proponents use this comparison to "shore-up" their arguments for LN privacy.

However, there are important caveats missing from LNs stated privacy claims which clearly invalidate any similarity between the two networks.

Persistent LN channel open/close/capacity information provides a data-point which can be used to derive information about route participants.

TOR specifically avoids a similar type of information leak by negotiating bandwidth offsets on a per-circuit basis to avoid fingerprinting by observation of net-flow.

LN payments are not and will never be as private/anonymous as communications on the TOR anonymity network as long as channel open capacities are known to network participants.

The LN onion readme (archive) states;

>...by encoding payment routes within a mix-net like packet, we are able to achieve the following security and privacy features:

  1. Participants in a route don't know their exact position within the route
  2. Participants within a route don't know the source of the payment, nor the ultimate destination of the payment
  3. Participants within a route aren't aware exactly how many other participants were involved in the payment route
  4. Each new payment route is computationally indistinguishable from any other payment route

Statements 1,2,3 are invalid during common routings.

Statement 4. I dunno...

Sample Route: nodeA -> nodeB -> nodeC -> nodeD

Statement 1 is invalidated; If nodeA (originator) has no other open channels than with a forwarding nodeB.

In this case, nodeB can know that it is the second hop in the route; it can be aware of its exact position in the route.

Statement 2 is invalidated; If nodeB knows that it is the second hop, it also knows nodeA is the source of the payment.

These caveats apply to the destination if destination nodeD has no other channels except with forwarding nodeC.

(Bonus: **St

... keep reading on reddit ➑

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πŸ‘€︎ u/deepechain
πŸ“…︎ Dec 28 2018
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Bringing a new meaning to onion routing
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πŸ‘€︎ u/rtfmplsty
πŸ“…︎ May 16 2019
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LokiNet is the reference implementation of LLARP (low latency anonymous routing protocol), a layer 3 onion routing protocol github.com/loki-project/l…
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πŸ“°︎ r/TOR
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πŸ‘€︎ u/eleitl
πŸ“…︎ Mar 28 2019
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Just switched to onion routing - need help testing

Please see if you can connect to 024[email protected]iieuwsb4krwktkrz.onion:9735

Cheers!

Please try to connect to my new address:

024[email protected]lcmy4wbbgymxypp4vozfdhsv5stnk4nssfpl6eimqnarcvea6uu6lgid.onion

I had settings incorrect in lnd.conf before,Now I have:

tor.active=1

tor.v3=1

tor.dns=nodes.lightning.directory

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πŸ“°︎ r/lightningnetwork
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πŸ‘€︎ u/VanDerWang
πŸ“…︎ Mar 10 2019
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Is onion routing appropriate for Lightning Network?

The privacy guarantees of Lightning transactions are highly questionable. Onion routing on Lightning Network provides far less privacy assurance than it does on Tor, and the ability for intermediaries to control routing decisions opens the potential for them to deanonymize senders or receivers. In particular, [BOLT #4: Onion Routing] (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md) makes the following claims regarding the privacy it affords routed transactions.

  • Intermediate hops cannot know about the other hops in a route other than their immediate predecessor and successor.
  • Intermediate hops cannot know their position in the route.
  • Intermediate hops cannot know if their predecessor is the originator or their successor the receiver of the transaction.

There exists conditions under which an intermediary hop most certainly can know these facts. These conditions are met in some of the most commonly cited use cases for Lightning Network. It may also be possible for an well funded adversary to manipulate the availability of channels on intermediary systems to influence or control route selection.

The failure is primarily in the mix-net features of routing. Although Lightning allows source routing, route options are restricted by the decisions of intermediaries. This is different than the intended use case for onion routing, where hops can be selected arbitrarily. The difference in topology can be seen by comparing the Tor white paper to the Lightning BOLT documentation.

Every node on Tor is connected (or has the potential to directly connect) with every other node:

> The Tor network is an overlay network; each onion router (OR) runs as a normal user-level process without any special privileges. Each onion router maintains a TLS [17] connection to every other onion router.

> Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router - 4 The Tor Design (page 4)

On Lightning Network nodes must share a channel in order to route directly between them:

> In the following example, it's assumed that aΒ sending node (origin node),Β n_0, wants to route a packet to aΒ receiving nodeΒ (final node), n_r. First, the sender computes a routeΒ {n_0, n_1, ..., n_{r-1}, n_r}, whereΒ n_0is the sender itself andΒ n_rΒ is the final recipient. The nodesΒ n_i andΒ n_{i+1}Β MUST be peers in the overlay network route.

> [BOLT #4: Onion Routing - Packet C

... keep reading on reddit ➑

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πŸ‘€︎ u/tripledogdareya
πŸ“…︎ Jan 20 2018
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Differences between Onion Routing (Public Key) and Tor-Circuit (Session Key)?

I have a hard time understanding how a message is transmitted, when the Public Keys are used and when the Session Keys.

  1. Tor Client connects to a directory server to get a list of active relays & exit relays with their policies (address, public key). I verify these list.
  2. Tor Client automatically chooses three relays with a compatible exit policy
  3. I start building my Tor-Circuit One-Hop at a time.
  4. I send a Create Cell to the Relay 1 (Is this encrypted with 1 Layer through the Public Key of Relay 1?)
  5. The First Hop and the Tor Client establish a temporarily Session Key through the Diffi-Hellmann-Key-Exchange
  6. The Tor Client requests Relay 1 to extend his Tor-Circuit with another Hop to Relay 2 (Is this encrypted with 2 Layers through the Public Key of Relay 1, Relay 2?)
  7. A second Session Key is established between the Tor Client and Relay 2, trough the Tor-Circuit. (Also encrypted in 2 Layers?)
  8. The Tor Client requests Relay 2 to extend the Tor-Circuit with another Hop to Relay 3

If this step isn't encrypted with 2 Layers (with the PK of Relay 1 & Relay 2), Relay 1 would know the address of Relay 3, or does it encrypt the Create Cell(R3) with the temporarily Session Keys.

If it uses the Session Keys to encrypt why would we need the Public Keys, to identify the Relays?

I thought the Session Key is only used for the response and the Public Keys for the Request, or do I understand something completly wrong?

In my current view the Request has three layers of Encryption with the Public Keys, on each layer it reveals the next target to forward the message. (but the relay already knows the next target, since it had to establish a tor-circuit)

The request is encrypted at each relay with the temporarily Session Key, the Client then can decrypt all three layers since it established these Key with the respective relay.

I'm no nativ english speaker, so I hope its understandable.

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πŸ‘€︎ u/Jesuz1402
πŸ“…︎ Jan 18 2019
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in-dht onion routing for libp2p github.com/hashmatter/lib…
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πŸ‘€︎ u/eleitl
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LokiNet is the reference implementation of LLARP (low latency anonymous routing protocol), a layer 3 onion routing protocol github.com/loki-project/l…
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πŸ‘€︎ u/eleitl
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TOR-Q-ALL - Secure Mobile Calls - Anonymity - Onion Routing youtube.com/watch?v=D3X7M…
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πŸ‘€︎ u/cookiecell
πŸ“…︎ Nov 24 2017
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LokiNet is the reference implementation of LLARP (low latency anonymous routing protocol), a layer 3 onion routing protocol github.com/loki-project/l…
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πŸ“°︎ r/privacytoolsIO
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πŸ‘€︎ u/eleitl
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Research: Maximizing privacy of the interledger protocol (ILP) via Tor-like onion routing circuits deepdotweb.com/2019/03/18…
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πŸ‘€︎ u/Cryptofortune
πŸ“…︎ Mar 19 2019
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in-dht onion routing for libp2p github.com/hashmatter/lib…
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Research: Comparing the performance of IP routing and onion routing (Tor) deepdotweb.com/2018/11/14…
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πŸ‘€︎ u/Cryptofortune
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LN Onion Routing ties to on-chain?

When transactions are made on the LN with onion routing encryption they are untraceable transactions off-chain on the LN, but can those off-chain untraceable transactions still be tied back on-chain to see all of the transaction details on public ledgers?

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πŸ‘€︎ u/acoen01
πŸ“…︎ May 09 2018
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Tribler's onion routing tribler.org/anonymity.htm…
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πŸ‘€︎ u/torrio888
πŸ“…︎ Aug 22 2016
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Onion routing is a pretty cool concept tho
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πŸ‘€︎ u/Memekip
πŸ“…︎ Nov 12 2018
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Does Lightning Network Onion Routing provide TOR-like privacy? /r/btc reddit.com/r/BitcoinAll/c…
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πŸ‘€︎ u/cryptoallbot
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Bitcoin Q&A: Lightning and onion routing explained with Andreas Antonopoulos youtube.com/watch?v=D-nKu…
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πŸ‘€︎ u/NimbleBodhi
πŸ“…︎ Jan 11 2018
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The #Bitcoin #Lightning Spec Part 5/8: Onion Routing Protocol medium.com/@rusty_lightni…
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πŸ‘€︎ u/Lite_Coin_Guy
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TheRegister.co.uk: "Brave Brave browser's hamburger menu serves Tor onion routing" theregister.co.uk/2018/06…
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πŸ‘€︎ u/bat-chriscat
πŸ“…︎ Jun 29 2018
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Does Lightning Network Onion Routing provide TOR-like privacy? /r/btc reddit.com/r/btc/comments…
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πŸ‘€︎ u/ABitcoinAllBot
πŸ“…︎ Dec 28 2018
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[Lightning-dev] [BOLT Draft] "Onion Routing Spec" by Christian Decker lists.linuxfoundation.org…
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πŸ‘€︎ u/eragmus
πŸ“…︎ Jul 25 2016
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Is there or could there be something like postal mail onion routing?
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πŸ‘€︎ u/benjaminikuta
πŸ“…︎ Nov 23 2016
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Net neutrality via blockchain: analyzing Loki Network’s onion routing mixnet medium.com/@mennovginkel/…
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πŸ‘€︎ u/mariejonabelle
πŸ“…︎ Jul 25 2018
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ELI5: The deep web, onion routing , and TOR
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πŸ‘€︎ u/Buzz1ightyear
πŸ“…︎ Mar 07 2013
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Is there or could there be something like postal mail onion routing?
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πŸ‘€︎ u/benjaminikuta
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